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Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context:
An American Viewpoint
Richard B. Bilder*

M

y assignment is to discuss sovereignty in its broadest aspects and
beyond our particular North American context. Certainly, sovereignty is a very popular subject these days. Conferences and writings
like our own, with titles such as The Problem of Sovereignty, Challenges to Sovereignty, The Limits of Sovereignty, and The Waning of
the Sovereign State are burgeoning." Professor Lou Henkin's 1992 address to the Canadian Council of International Law was on The Mythology of Sovereignty.2 U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has recently said that: "A major intellectual requirement of our times is to
rethink the question of sovereignty." 3 And the just-completed 1994
meeting of the American Society of International Law, which some of
you may have attended and I will here
4 draw upon, had as its theme
"The Transformation of Sovereignty."
Clearly, something is happening to the old idea of sovereignty, but
what it is and why people are now talking so much about it is not so
Professor of Law University of Wisconsin-Madison.
For recent discussions, see, e.g., Conference on ChangingNotions of Sovereignty and the

*Burrus-Bascom
1

Role of Private Actors in InternationalLaw, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 1 (Fall 1993); J.
Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: ChangingNorms and Rules of Sovereignty in InternationalRelations, 48 INT'L. ORG. 107 (1994); Christopher H. Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards and New Paradigmfor InternationalLaw?, 4 EJIL 447
(1993); Joseph A. Camilleri, Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World, in CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY (R.B.J. Walker and S.H. Mendlovitz, eds., 1990); Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'I. L.J. 397
(1991); Oscar Schachter, Sovereignty - Then and Now, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA
ch. 45 (R. St. J. Macdonald, ed., 1993); Richard Falk, Evasions of Sovereignty, in CONTENDING
SOVEREIGNTIES, supra at 61; W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 866 (1990).
2 Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty (notes from addresses delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Council on International Law, October 1992, and the International
Law Weekend in New York, November 1992), reprinted in Notes From the President, ASIL
NEWSLETTER, March-May 1993, at 1. For an earlier expression, see Louis Henkin, International
Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 REC. DES COURs 24-28 (1989-IV).
3 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 89, 98-99 (Winter 1992/93).
" See The Transformation of Sovereignty, AM. SoC'Y OF INT'L L. (April 6-9, 1994, Washington, D.C.) (particularly its panels on Theoretical Perspectives on the Transformation of Sovereignty, InternationalLaw: The Rise of Nationalism and the Break-up of States, Multiple Tiers
of Sovereignty: The Future of InternationalGovernance, and The End of Sovereignty?) (forthcoming in 1993 ASIL PROCEEDINGS).

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:9 1994

clear. What I will try to do here is:
* First, briefly indicate some of the ways scholars have defined sovereignty, as well as some possible other current meanings.
" Second, note some of the recent developments and changes in our
world and ways of dealing with each other that may be stimulating
this recent concern with sovereignty.
• And third, suggest some implications of these developments, both
for the continued usefulness of the concept of sovereignty and for
how we think about the structure and governance of our international society.
A.

What does "sovereignty" mean?5

I think that the term sovereignty is very generally used to mean
simply a state's right to do as it wishes, particularly within its own
territory, free of external constraint or interference. But here are some
more scholarly definitions:
" The American Heritage Dictionary defines sovereignty as
"supremacy of authority or rule as exercised by a sovereign or sovereign state" or, alternatively, as "complete independence and selfgovernment." 6
o
Max Huber, as Arbitrator in the 1926 Island of Palmas case, wrote
that: "Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right
to exercise there, to the exclusion of any other states, the function of
a state."'
* Judge Alvarez, in his individual opinion in the Corfu Channel case,
wrote that: "By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights
and attributes which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other states, and also in its relations with other states." 8
• Helmut Steinberger, in the Encyclopedia of Public International
Law says that: "Sovereignty... denotes the basic international legal
status of a state that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction,
to the governmental, executive, legislative, or territorial jurisdiction
of a foreign state or to foreign law other than public international
5 For a selection of the literature on sovereignty, see 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PEACE 124 n.1 (Sir R. Jennings & Sir A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (1981) (with extensive bibliography); Bengt Broms, States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 41 (M.
Bedjaovi ed., 1991); Bernard R. Crick, Sovereignty, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 78 (D.L. Sills ed., 1968).
6 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1725 (3rd ed. 1992).
Island of Palmas case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 821, 838 (1928) (Huber,
Arb.).
1 Corfu Channel case (UK v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43.
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law." 9
* Professor Lou Henkin, in How Nations Behave, writes that the principle holds that: ". . . except as limited by international law or
treaty, each state is master of its own territory." 10
* And at the recent ASIL meeting, Professor Tom Franck suggested,
interestingly and much more broadly, that a going definition of sovereignty is the loci of the formation of rights and duties generally
recognized as establishing and implementing entitlements, distributions and obligations. 1 '
Certainly, whatever the precise definition of sovereignty, there is
general agreement that it is a comparatively new and primarily western
idea; that it emerged as a theory of the internal power and authority of
the ruler of the state in connection with the consolidation of territorial
authority and emergence of the state system in Europe in the late 17th
century; and that its application to the role of the state in its international relations is controversial and problematic. In particular, there
seems little disagreement that states, however "sovereign" they may be
internally, remain bound as members of the international community
by international law. Sir Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, in their
new 9th edition of Oppenheim's InternationalLaw, emphatically make
this last point as follows:
The 20th century has seen the attempt, particularly through the
emergence in some instances of extreme nationalism, to transpose this
essentially internal concept of sovereignty on to the international
plane. In its extreme forms such a transposition is inimical to the normal functioning and development of international law and organisation. It is also inappropriate. Sovereignty as supreme legal power and
authority is inapplicable to the position of states within the international community: no state has supreme legal power and authority
over other states in general, nor are states generally subservient to the
legal power and authority of other states. Thus the relationship of
states on the international plane is characterized by their equality and
independence and, in fact, by their interdependence. Although states
are often referred to as 'sovereign' states, that is descriptive of their
internal constitutional position rather than of their legal status on the
international plane.
Despite the deficiencies in international law which at present
make it an imperfect legal order - deficiencies which are in some
respects gradually being overcome - the very notion of international
law as a body of rules of conduct binding upon states irrespective of
their internal law, implies the idea of their subjection to international
9 Steinberger,

supra note 5, at 408.

How NATIONS BEHAVE 18 (1968).
" See The Transformation of Sovereignty, supra note 4 (I have relied on my notes of the
relevant panel, which may not reflect his exact words).
20 Louis HENKIN,
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The recent discussion at the ASIL meeting suggested, however,
that the term "sovereignty" is being used to convey a variety of other
and wider ideas and concerns as well. It was pointed out that the word
"sovereignty" often seemed to be used as a surrogate for what was really "statehood," and of various attributes ascribed to the traditional
state, such as "independence," "equality," "autonomy," "domestic jurisdiction" and "reserved domain," "self-determination," or "non-intervention." And speakers there vied in explicating other meanings and
suggesting adjectives and metaphors to describe what they saw as the
complexity of the concept; for example, sovereignty was described as
"multi-layered," "multi-faceted," and "many-tiered," and compared to
an onion, a swiss-cheese, and even, rather remarkably, an overcooked
potato and a chocolate. Indeed, the discussion at the ASIL meeting
suggested to me that the current concern about sovereignty is not simply about the scope of the state's autonomous authority, but is rather a
reflection of deeper uncertainties, concerns and tensions about the
changing nature of our international order and, in particular, of the
role of the state in that order.
We have, of course, traditionally viewed our international and political order as comprised of a plurality of coexisting sovereign, autonomous and coequal states, voluntarily joining together in community
with each other and establishing cooperative rules, arrangements and
institutions in order to deal with common problems. In essence, this
classical model analogizes states to individuals with similar attributes,
and sees them as establishing an international society and legal order
- in effect, an "international club" - through social contract. Correspondingly, just as our Lockean political theory conceives the individuals who enter into a social contract to establish a state as deliberately
reserving to themselves an area of private autonomy or liberty, the
classical model of international relations views states as reserving to
their own authority those matters which they have not voluntarily
placed within the area of common governance and international law.
These reserved matters, outside the normal reach of international regulation, are what we usually refer to as the area of "domestic jurisdiction." Of course, it is well-recognized that over time states, through
treaty or the development of custom, may and do shift the accepted
boundaries between what is regarded as matters of international concern and obligation, reflected by international law and governance, and
matters of solely internal concern or "domestic jurisdiction."
What seems to now be occurring is that this entire classical model
of international governance - for which the term "sovereignty" appears in one sense to have become a code-word or symbol - is under
12

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 25.
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challenge. People are questioning not only whether this classical model
really reflects the way our current world and governance system now
operates, but whether it reflects the way our international system
should work.
B. What Has Been Happening to Cause Us to Reexamine Our International Order?
Everyone has his or her own list of what they consider the most
relevant recent developments. Let me briefly mention several that I believe to be particularly significant. 13
First, it is obvious that the morphology of the existing international system is changing and becoming more fluid. For one thing, the
number of players in the game of nations is increasing; there are now
close to 200 states, almost four times the number of states when the
U.N. was founded almost 50 years ago. With the breakup of the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and other nations, the idea that states are permanent and basic has clearly become frayed. We are becoming more used
to states appearing, disappearing and fragmenting and terms such as
"failed-states" and "nation-building" no longer seem surprising. At the
same time, intergovernmental international organizations are proliferating at a bewildering rate - a recent publication states that there are
14
now almost 5000 global and regional intergovernmental organizations
- and it has become commonplace that the U.N., EEC and many of
the IGO's are playing an ever-growing role in the governance of a vast
range of transnational and international matters. In particular, the current trend towards economic integration - the EEC, our own
NAFTA, ASEAN and other blocs - is rapidly reducing the number
of significant actors in the world trading community. Finally, as often
noted, a broad variety of other nonstate actors - transnational corporations, transnational nongovernmental organizations, ethnic and indigenous groups and even individuals - are either now participating, or
pressing to participate in the international game.
Second, it is obvious that the extent and nature of transnational
interactions are undergoing profound change, and that this change is
moving us generally in the direction of both increasing international
interdependence and globalization and a declining relevance of national
identity and boundaries. As often noted, these developments include:
* the technological revolution in transportation, communication and
information-technology, with its accompanying tendency to establish
a globalization of markets, ideas, language, aspirations and culture.
13 My comments here draw in part on some previous remarks published as Bilder, International Law in the 'New World Order: Some Preliminary Reflections, 1 FLA. ST. U. J.TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 1 (1992).

24

[1989/1990] 3 l.B.

OF INT'L ORGANIZATIONs

422 (7th ed. 1989).
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a growing freedom of world trade and capital movements from the
traditional constraints of national boundaries, as reflected in the
growth of transnational corporations, global sources of manufacturing, offshore banking, and even international narcotics and arms
traffic.
o massive transnational flows of immigrants and refugees, often without regard to national boundaries.
" an increasing awareness of a variety of transcendent environmental
and other threats, such as widespread pollution, atmospheric warming, depletion of the ozone layer, destruction of the rain forests, and
even AIDs, which affect all humanity without regard to nationality
or boundaries and which cannot be dealt with except by common
action transcending national borders.
" With the end of the cold war and recent experience of the Gulf
crisis, an apparent increased willingness to pursue through collective
action and international institutions an increasing range of broadlyagreed-on-and-shared international community interests - such as
the maintenance of international peace and security, human rights,
and environmental preservation, even where this may to some extent
intrude on matters traditionally considered as reserved to the sovereignty or "domestic jurisdiction" of states. Examples include the
U.N.'s recent operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Cambodia as well
as its current far-reaching claims to limit armaments and compel
reparations by Iraq, to try war crimes in former Yugoslavia, and to
require Libya to extradite to the U.S. and U.K. the alleged perpetrators of the Pan Am Lockerbie disaster.
One may well question whether we are yet on the brink of a "New
World Order." But there seems little question that collectively these
developments are profoundly affecting how our international and national rules and decisions are being made and implemented. In areas
such as trade, environment and human rights in particular, the clear
lines between domestic and international politics and law are breaking
down; domestic and international governance mechanisms are becoming increasingly interdependent, and jurisdictional limits and
frameworks of authority are becoming more intertwined and blurred.
And, of course, with the increasing proliferation and overlapping of
regulatory authority, the work of lawyers dealing with transnational
problems is becoming ever more complex and demanding.
"

C. What Do These Developments Imply for the Way We Think
About States, Sovereignty and Our System of InternationalOrder?
Depending on their interests and perspectives, people draw different conclusions. Some claim that the traditional international system,
based on the idea of autonomous and coequal sovereign states, has simply outlived its purpose or usefulness and needs to be replaced by a new
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supranational or other system of governance. Others argue that the
traditional system should be retained - "there's life in the old thing
yet!" - but with substantial modifications to permit a greater participation by nonstate actors, as well as a more flexible, nuanced and
multi-layered approach to transnational governance. And still others including states which have only recently begun to participate fully in
the international system and are eager to partake of the privileges of
sovereignty - remain ardent supporters of the traditional system, and
indeed seem inclined to push the idea of exclusive state authority and
freedom from external restraint as far as they can.
Certainly, it is time for us to take a hard look at the nature and
appropriate functions of the state in our modern international legal order, and, as Professor Henkin advocates, to strip it of its mystique. After all, the state, like any system of political organization or governance, is just a tool - a social invention we have devised to help us to
coexist and achieve our common purposes. As Brierly has noted:
The truth is that states are not persons, however convenient it may
often be to personify them; they are merely institutions, that is to say
organizations which men establish among themselves for certain objects, of which the most fundamental is a system of order within
which the activities of their common life can be carried on.15
Whether in our U.S.-Canadian relations or in our broader international
dealings, we have a broad field in which to experiment in building the
governance arrangements and institutions we believe to be most useful
and appropriate. Sovereignty need be no greater limit in this respect
than we choose to make it.
Where are such a reexamination - and indeed the pressure and
logic of the changes which are occurring - likely to take us? Most
likely, it will be a somewhat different kind of international legal order,
in which the traditional state, while still an important actor, plays a
somewhat less dominant and more ambiguous role. As we have seen, it
is likely to be a transnational order in which nationality and borders
are less relevant, power and authority are more diffuse, and the
processes of transnational regulation and governance are more multilayered and complex. And among other things, we are certainly likely
to see a continuation and strengthening of many of the developments
currently occurring, including for example:
an increasing trend towards seeking organized collective solutions to
the growing number of problems we face which simply transcend
the problem-solving capacity of individual states - problems of international security and arms control, human rights, environmental
degradation, poverty, health and management of the international
15 J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 54-55 (6th ed. Waldock 1963).
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commons.
" greater access to and participation in governance processes and institutions by non-state actors, such as ethnic and indigenous groups,
transnational corporations, NGO's and other traditionally excluded
groups, as well as greater transparency and openness of these
processes and institutions to the concerned public.
" less deference by the international community and other participants in the international system to the mystique of state sovereignty and claims of domestic jurisdiction, and a greater willingness
to assert and enforce broadly agreed international community policies, interests and values, such as those concerning human rights,
even when this may impinge upon a state's traditionally exclusive
internal authority.
o perhaps a greater willingness to question, or indeed challenge, the
legitimacy of particular states' participation in the international
community and global legal order where it has become clear that
their governing elites are inherently unwilling to respect fundamental human rights, democratic values and the rule of law.
In his 1992 talk to the CCIL on The Mythology of Sovereignty, Professor Lou Henkin called for abandoning the term "sovereignty," arguing that it was all too often used for abusive purposes. He noted that:
Governments raise iron curtains of 'sovereignty' to resist international
cooperation and frustrate international norms and institutions, to conceal atrocities behind state boundaries, to prevent their investigation
and discovery, to preclude judgment and condemnation under international law and reaction by international institutions.'"
While recognizing that "sovereignty" sometimes does subsume important values, Professor Henkin urged:
It is time to bring sovereignty down to earth; to examine, analyze,
reconceive the concept, cut it down to size, break out its normative
content, repackage it, perhaps even rename it. The quixotic among us
might gird for a campaign to extirpate the term and forbid its uses in
polite political or intellectual company or in international law."7
And he concluded: "Away with the 's' word!"
However, this may not be so easy. For, as Professor James Crawford pointed out at the recent ASIL meeting, even if we give up Professor Henkin's small "s" word - "sovereignty" - we are inevitably still
left with the big "S" word - the State. And, as we have seen, it seems
likely that the state and its attributes - many of which are indeed
commonly described by the term "sovereignty" - will still be with us
for some time to come.
:6 Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, supra note 2.
17 Id.
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Moreover, perhaps sovereignty deserves at least a few words in its
defense. Many people -

and I include myself -

believe it is important

that every participant in a political community be regarded as entitled
to some measure of autonomy or private space in which (s)he is free to
seek to realize his or her own potential and work out his or her own
destiny, as (s)he may choose, without interference by the outside community. However broadly or narrowly this zone of autonomy may be
defined by different communities, the concept that good government requires that the subjects of any governance system have at least some
protected area of freedom from overbearing authority is a cherished
feature of all liberal and non-totalitarian societies. This idea seems embodied, for example, not only in our democratic tradition of personal
liberty, but also in the structure of our American and Canadian federal
systems, and, at the international level, in the concept of domestic jurisdiction entrenched in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.
The idea of sovereignty seems to me, in at least one sense, to reflect this claim of a particular political community to the freedom to be
left alone to do what it considers best -

"its own thing" -

at least so

long as it is not causing harm to its own people or others. Certainly,
Canadians have been sympathetic to the idea that states should be entitled to considerable freedom to retain and develop their own identity
and policies without undue interference from more powerful neighbors!
To this extent, at least, the concept of "sovereignty" may be worth
preserving.

